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Rhode Island's Public Importance
Exception for Advisory Opinions:
The Unconstitutional Exercise of a
Non-Judicial Power
Thomas R. Bender*
INTRODUCTION
"[W]hile [the] unconstitutional exercise of power by the execu-
tive and legislative branches of the government is subject to judi-
cial restraint, the only check upon [a supreme court's] exercise of
power is [its] own sense of self-restraint."' That sense of self-
restraint promotes "confidence in the men and women who admin-
ister the judicial system [which] is the true backbone of the rule of
law"2 - a confidence that is both a "public treasure," and "a vitally
necessary ingredient of any successful effort to protect basic lib-
erty."
3
The Rhode Island State Constitution confers two distinct
powers upon the state's highest court and the justices appointed to
it. The court itself owns a "judicial power," while the individual
justices are endowed with a separate "advisory power," permitting
them to render nonbinding legal advice to the two remaining
branches of the state government. This article is concerned with
the advisory power conferred by article 10, section 3 of the Rhode
* B.A., University of Rhode Island, 1979; J.D., Washington and Lee Univer-
sity School of Law, 1982. Mr. Bender is a partner in the firm of Hanson
Curran LLP in Providence, RI where he practices appellate litigation.
1. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissent-
ing).
2. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 157-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Island Constitution, which declares: "The judges of the supreme
court shall give their written opinion upon any question of law
whenever requested by the governor or by either house of the gen-
eral assembly."4 The broad question posed herein is whether the
justices have exercised the necessary "sense of self restraint" in
determining the limits of the advisory power conferred by the
State Constitution. The more specific query is whether the justices
have the constitutional authority, as they reasserted most recently
in In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Casino),5 to render an
advisory opinion under the "public importance" exception they
have described. The answer to both questions, it seems clear, is
no.
The advisory power, unique to only a small handful of states, 6
challenges the separation of powers and the independence of the
judiciary. It possesses the potential to empower the legislature to
engage the justices in the cause of directing or influencing the ex-
ecutive's exercise of its constitutional duties, and for the executive
to do likewise with regard to the legislature's exercise of its own
constitutional duties. In the 1960's, the justices met this chal-
lenge, however, by narrowly construing the phrase "any question
of law" to limit their obligation to answer questions involving in-
terbranch disputes.7 Since that time they have consistently main-
tained that the phrase "any question of law", when construed in
light of the separation of powers, obliges them to answer questions
from the legislature only with respect to proposed or pending leg-
islation, and from the governor only with respect to enacted legis-
lation he or she has a present constitutional duty to implement.8
In that way the justices may assist both branches in the exercise
of their own constitutional duties, but may not be used by the gov-
ernor to regulate the legislature when it is considering legislation,
or by the legislature to regulate the governor's execution of the
laws. It is the thesis of this article, however, that the justices' ju-
dicial interpretation of "any question of law" not only limits their
obligation to answer questions not falling within that interpreta-
4. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 3.
5. 856 A.2d 320 (R.I. 2004).
6. See Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Advisory Opinions: A Wise Change for
Louisiana and its Judiciary?, 38 LoY. L. REV. 329, 336-38 (1992).
7. See Opinion to the Governor, 191 A.2d 611, 614 (R.I. 1963).
8. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Casino), 856 A.2d at 324.
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tion, but also necessarily limits their constitutional authority to
answer them.
The Rhode Island Constitution is the source of all power de-
volving to the judiciary. Article 10, section 3 is the source of the
justice's authority to render advice.9 No one would seriously argue
that in the absence of the advisory clause the justices could step
out of their judicial robes and offices, and in their capacity as indi-
vidual citizens licensed to practice law, give legal advice and opin-
ions to the governor or the legislature regarding the legality of
their actions or legislation. 10 And, in point of fact, they do not pur-
port to do so. The justices consider briefs, take the bench, hear ar-
gument and issue written advisory opinions specifically in their
capacity as judicial officers under the authority of article 10, sec-
tion 3. Consequently, they may only exercise this power if author-
ized by that section, and they may only advise on questions to
which the advisory clause pertains. By interpreting the phrase,
"shall give their written opinion upon any question of law," to limit
the questions they are obliged to answer, the justices have also
limited the questions they are constitutionally authorized to an-
swer. The same separation of powers considerations that limit
their obligation to provide advisory opinions should limit their
constitutional authority to provide them as well.
It seems, however, the justices do not see it that way. In re-
cent years, they have asserted that the textual interpretation they
have given to "any question of law" limits only their obligation to
provide advice, and constitutes a mere procedural limitation they
9. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 1.
10. Aside from the separation of powers issues implicated by a justice, as
a member of the Court and an officer of the judicial branch, acting as legal
counsel for either the Governor or General Assembly, the Code of Judicial
Conduct prohibits a judge from practicing law, R.I. SuP. CT. R. art. VI, canon
4(G); conducting his or her "extra-judicial activities" in a manner that would
"cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge,"
R.I. SUP. CT. R. art. VI, canon 4(A)(1); unnecessarily displaying a "premature
judgment," R.I. SUP. CT. R. art. VI, canon 3(B)(5)(iii); and participating in a
case where he or she has "served as a lawyer in the manner in controversy."
R.I. SuP. CT. R. art. VI, canon 3(E)(1)(b). In the absence of the advisory clause,
the justice would be giving legal advice concerning a matter that could very
well later come before him or her in his or her judicial capacity. Except in the
limited circumstances of the advisory clause, both systemic constitutional
considerations and ethical considerations would prohibit a justice of the court
from providing legal counsel to either the executive or legislative branches.
2004] 125
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can waive if the question is of significant public importance." In
short, the justices have asserted their textual interpretation limits
only the justices' obligation, not their authority. I will argue that
the fashioning of a discretionary "public importance" exception is
an internally inconsistent interpretation of both the text of article
10, section 3 and the justices' own prior opinions, and that on
every occasion the justices issue an advisory opinion pursuant to
that exception they act outside their constitutional authority; that
is, they themselves engage in an unconstitutional exercise. I will
respectfully suggest the justices reexamine the constitutional and
interpretative foundation for the public importance exception and
discard it. No discretionary advisory authority can plausibly issue
from the constitutional text, and fidelity to both the constitution
and its reasonable judicial interpretation are issues of the greatest
public importance.
This article begins with a brief explanation of the two distinct
powers the Rhode Island Constitution confers on the Rhode Island
Supreme Court and its justices.
I. JUDICIAL POWER VS. ADVISORY POWER
Article 10, section 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution states
"[t]he judicial power of this state shall be vested in one supreme
court, and in such inferior courts as the general assembly may,
from time to time, ordain and establish."12 The language is virtu-
ally identical to the first sentence of Article III, Section 1 of the
United States Constitution,13 but the text of the federal constitu-
tion goes on to specifically limit the judicial power to cases and
controversies. 14 Although the Rhode Island Constitution does not
explicitly place a case or controversy limitation on the exercise of
judicial power, the Rhode Island Supreme Court long ago con-
cluded the "whole idea of judicial power" is limited to the power to
11. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Casino), 856 A.2d at 324-
25.
12. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 1 (emphasis added).
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000) ("The Constitution's case-
or-controversy limitation on federal judicial authority, Art. III, §2, underpins
both our standing and our mootness jurisprudence.").
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apply laws to "cases and controversies" within the court's jurisdic-
tion.15 In G. & D. Taylor & Co. v. Place'6, the court stated:
Indeed, laws and courts have their origin in the necessity
of rules and means to enforce them, to be applied to cases
and controversies within their jurisdiction; and our whole
idea of judicial power is, the power of the [courts] to apply
the [laws] to the decision of those cases and controver-
sies.' 7
The case or controversy concept defines and limits the proper
exercise of judicial power, and "is used to embrace a number of re-
lated but different problems of judicial authority, including the re-
quirement of a concrete dispute between adversaries, standing,
ripeness, mootness and limitations relating to political ques-
tions."8 Standing is the first step in the pathway to a case or con-
troversy empowering a court to act in a judicial capacity. It is not
only "an access barrier that calls for the assessment of one's cre-
dentials to bring suit;"19 it is an access barrier calling for an as-
sessment of the court's credentials to exercise its constitutionally
conferred judicial power. 20 Standing entitles a party to an adjudi-
cation and empowers the court to adjudicate: "The essence of the
question of standing is whether a party seeking relief has alleged
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to ensure
concrete adverseness that sharpens the presentation of the issues
upon which the court depends for an illumination of the questions
presented."2' Under Rhode Island law, standing exists to com-
mence a suit and invoke the judicial power when the claimant al-
15. Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 752 (R.I. 1997) (citing G. & D. Tay-
lor & Co. v. Place, 4 R.I. 324, 337 (1856)).
16. 4 R.I. 324 (1856).
17. Id. at 337 (emphasis added). The case or controversy requirement
was more recently reaffirmed in In re Stephanie B., 826 A.2d 985, 999 (R.I.
2003): "This Court has previously concluded that 'our whole idea of judicial
power' is entailed within the concept of courts applying laws to cases and con-
troversies within their jurisdiction."
18. Neely v. Benefits Review Bd., 139 F.3d 276, 279 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.1, at 41 (1989)).
19. Associated Builders & Contractors of R.I., Inc. v. Dep't of Admin., 787
A.2d 1179, 1185 (R.I. 2002) (quoting Blackstone Valley Chamber of Com-
merce v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 452 A.2d 931, 932 (R.I. 1982)).
20. See Blackstone Valley Chamber of Commerce, 452 A.2d at 932.
21. Id. at 933.
2004]
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leges "an injury in fact resulting from the challenged act."22
The related concepts of "standing," "case or controversy" and
"judicial power" are all "built on a single basic idea - the idea of
separation of powers."23 They reflect the "overriding and time-
honored concern about keeping the judiciary's power within its
proper constitutional sphere," and counsel against a court acced-
ing to the natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of impor-
tant disputes and settle them simply for the sake of convenience
and efficiency. 24 The constitutional elements of a court's authority
to exercise judicial power - such as a case or controversy - "are an
essential ingredient of separation and equilibrium of powers, re-
straining the courts from acting at certain times, and even re-
straining them from acting permanently regarding certain
subjects."25 In sum, constitutionally conferred judicial power does
not permit advisory opinions; that is, decisions when there is no
case or controversy presenting an injured party seeking redress
for an injury. Advisory opinions are beyond the "judicial power."26
22. Pontbraind v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 862 (R.I. 1997) (quoting R. I.
Opthalmological Soc'y v. Cannon, 317 A.2d 124, 129 (R.I. 1974)).
23. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997).
24. Id.
25. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998).
26. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has relaxed the case or controversy
requirement in the limited circumstances where a case has met the prerequi-
sites of case or controversy when initiated, but has subsequently been ren-
dered moot because "events occurring after the filing have deprived the
litigant of a continuing stake in the controversy." In re Christopher B., 823
A.2d 301, 319 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Cicilline v. Almond, 809 A.2d 1101, 1105
(R.I. 2000)). In that limited circumstance the court will adjudicate the case -
that is, decide it as part of an exercise of its judicial power - despite its moot-
ness when the issues are of "extreme public importance," "capable of repeti-
tion," but are likely to "evade judicial review." In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d
at 319; see also Fiore v. Town of South Kingstown, 783 A.2d 944, 946 (R.I.
2001); State ex. rel. Town of Middletown v. Anthony, 713 A.2d 207, 211 (R.I.
1998); Edward A. Sherman Publ'g Co. v. Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1256 n.6
(R.I. 1982); Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 139 (R.I. 1980).
Standing, however, "admits of no similar exception; if a plaintiff lacks
standing at the time the action commences, the fact that the dispute is capa-
ble of repetition yet evading review will not entitle the complaint to a 0 judi-
cial forum." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs., Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 191 (2000). Mootness and standing are distinct concepts. Where a party
has no standing a court has no right to exercise the judicial power granted to
it and the power does not extend to such a case. Where a case that has ful-
filled the standing requirement has become moot because of post-filing cir-
cumstances, to abandon the case may prove more wasteful than frugal, and
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Unlike the federal and vast majority of state constitutions, 27
the Rhode Island Constitution confers an additional power on the
members of the court distinct from, and not included in, the judi-
cial power. As previously stated, article 10, section 3 provides:
"The judges of the supreme court shall give their written opinion
upon any question of law whenever requested by the governor or
by either house of the general assembly."28 This constitutional
grant of power has been characterized by the court as a "constitu-
tional exception to the case and controversy predicate to the exer-
cise of our judicial power."29 In truth, it is not an exception
permitting use of the court's judicial power in the absence of a
case or controversy; rather, it bestows a nonjudicial power in the
absence of a case or controversy on each of the individual men and
women sworn in as justices of that court - the power to render le-
gal advice to the two remaining branches of government. When
rendering such advise the justices speak in their "individual ca-
pacity as legal experts rather than Supreme Court justices,"30 and
give non-binding advice which "carries no mandate."31 The advi-
sory opinion is "not an exercise of judicial power,"32 and is dis-
tinctly "extra-judicial."33
would permit the challenged conduct to recur. See id. at 189, 191-92. There-
fore, a court may still plausibly apply its judicial power to the controversy in
limited circumstances.
27. Calogero, supra note 6, at 330 ("[N]ot sactioned by the vast majority
of the fifty states or by the federal courts of the United States[, advisory]
opinions are currently in use in eleven states.").
28. R.I. Const. art. X, § 3.
29. Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 572 n.5 (R.I. 1997).
30. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Casino), 856 A.2d 320, 323
(R.I. 2004).
31. Id. (quoting Opinion to the Governor, 174 A.2d 553, 554 (R.I. 1961)).
32. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Casino), 856 A.2d at 323
("[Tihis opinion is not an exercise of judicial power.... ."); Opinion to the Gov-
ernor, 174 A.2d at 554 ("not an exercise of our judicial power").
33. Calogero, supra note 6, at 338 (describing advisory opinions as an
"extrajudicial exercise of power"); see also ALBERT R. ELLINGWOOD,
DEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT 41-42 n.166 (1918) (not-
ing support for the possibility that judges gave "extra-judicial advice" in colo-
nial times); STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF
EARLY JUDGES, 2, 47 (1997); Note, Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality
of Statutes, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1302, 1303 (1956) ("Justices have characterized
the advisory function as extrajudicial on the theory that they are acting indi-
vidually as men learned in the law .. .. "); Note, The Case for an Advisory
Function in the Federal Judiciary, 50 GEO. L.J. 785, 809 (1962) [hereinafter
2004] 129
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A. The Origins of the Advisory Power of Rhode Island Justices
The justices of the Rhode Island Supreme Court have them-
selves noted that many authorities consider the advisory power
incompatible with the judicial function.34 The separation of powers
considerations defining and limiting the exercise of judicial power
also challenge the exercise of the advisory power.35 How did the
advisory power end up in a constitution ostensibly built on separa-
tion of powers and a defined judicial power? A partial explanation
may be found in the English origins of the advisory clause which
seeped into Rhode Island's colonial and early state governmental
organization - where there was no separation of powers, no inde-
pendent judiciary, and no judicial review as we know it today -
and in the struggle to enact a state constitution.
The advisory opinion has its roots in English history. "By the
14th century it was a well-established practice of the King's Bench,
a body of legally trained judges, to issue advisory opinions to the
King and his Council" who exercised all three powers of govern-
ment: legislative, executive, and judicial. 36 While most royal in-
quiries concerned the King's legislative and executive duties, some
inquiries also required advice on matters that were due to come
before the judges themselves:37
The judges [of the King's Bench] were also required to act
as counselors to the House of Lords, . .. called upon to
render their advice when the House acted in either its
judicial capacity, as final arbiter of cases arising before
Parliament, or in its legislative capacity... renderting]
advice on existing law and on pending legislation.38
"In its early history the House of Lords summoned the judges
at the beginning of each Parliament" to give advice on legal ques-
tions; the advice was nonbinding but virtually always followed by
the Lords. 39 Up to the time of the American Revolution, "both the
Note, Advisory Function] (describing the rendering of an advisory opinion as
"a distinctly extrajudicial function").
34. See Opinion to the Governor, 174 A.2d at 554.
35. Calogero, supra note 6, at 362.
36. Id. at 335.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Note, Advisory Function, supra note 33, at 787-88.
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King and the House of Lords regularly requested advice from the
justices on judicial, as well as executive, and legislative matters."40
By the middle of the 1600's, English constitutionalism was
premised on the theory of a "mixed" government, 41 a theory quite
different from the principle of separation of powers that would be-
come the hallmark of American constitutionalism. The English
Parliament was composed of the "three estates of the realm -
Crown, Lords and Commons - who, together, represent[ed] the
sovereignty of the people."62 Each were thought to make a valu-
able and effective contribution to law-making, and "roughly corre-
sponded to Aristotle's ideal form of 'mixed government,'... each of
which had virtues that would act as a check on the vices of the
other."43 "Because the entire realm was represented in it, Parlia-
ment was considered both 'omnipotent' and 'omnicompetent' 44
with its own internal system of checks and balances. 45 In this sys-
tem the highest judicial power was in the House of Lords, not the
King's judges, and "[t]he Lords were 'the supreme court of judica-
ture in the kingdom, both for final appeals from lower courts and
as the original court for trials of peers and impeachments.' 46 The
advisory power, therefore, arose in the context of a constitutional
system that did not separate judicial power from the legislative or
executive power, and in which the ultimate judicial power rested
not in the judges, but in the body that also exercised legislative
power.47 The judges acted in the capacity of legal counselors to the
persons exercising ultimate executive, legislative and judicial au-
thority, and did not possess the power of judicial review over legis-
lative and executive actions. 48
Similar to the English system, "American colonial govern-
ments did not separate the legislative, executive and judicial func-
tions" either, and "judges in the colonial structure were by their
40. Calogero, supra note 6, at 335.
41. JAY, supra note 33, at 22.
42. Matthew P. Harrington, Judicial Review Before John Marshall, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 55 (2003).
43. Id. at 58.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 61.
46. JAY, supra note 33, at 25 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *56).
47. See id. at 52.
48. See Note, Advisory Function, supra note 33, at 807-08.
2004]
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very positions continually involved in the process of advising ex-
ecutive and legislative bodies."49 Under the Royal Charter of 1663,
Rhode Island was governed by a General Assembly consisting of a
governor, a deputy governor and ten assistants elected annually.50
Those same men also constituted the colony's highest court; thus,
legislative and judicial functions were combined in the same body
and the General Assembly exercised extensive control over the ju-
dicial affairs of the colony.51 In 1746 the governor and assistants
were removed from the court and replaced by annually appointed
justices, one chief and four associate justices.5 2 The judges could
still be members of the General Assembly, however, and the Gen-
eral Assembly itself had the power to decide petitions praying for
relief from decisions of the court, powers similar to those pos-
sessed by the English House of Lords. 53 The petition process and
the annual appointment of judges existed under the Charter
throughout the colonial period and during statehood up until the
establishment of the state's first constitution in 1843.54 As the
Rhode Island Supreme Court later noted in Gorham v. Robinson,55
under the Charter the General Assembly:
had the power to remove any of the judges at any time;
and, as to the principles of separation of powers and of
the independence of the judiciary, we cannot see that they
were given much recognition under a system of govern-
ment in which all the judges of the highest court were
annually elected by the General Assembly, which also
claimed and, whenever it chose, exercised the power to ad-
judicate cases and to reverse the decisions and judgment
of the [state's highest court].56
Under the Charter, therefore, no "independent" judiciary ex-
49. JAY, supra note 33, at 52.
50. PATRICK T. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE ISLAND'S
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: 1776-1841 24 (1977).
51. PATRICK T. CONLEY, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF LAWS AND
LAWYERS IN RHODE ISLAND: 1636-1998 18-19, 21 (1998) [hereinafter CONLEY,
LIBERTY AND JUSTICE].
52. Id. at 21-22.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 22.
55. 186 A. 832 (R.I. 1936).
56. Id. at 841.
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isted under any meaningful definition of that term,5 7 nor was
there any meaningful separation of powers.58 Consequently there
was no real doctrinal or political discordance with the judges act-
ing in an advisory capacity as opposed to a judicial capacity.
The celebrated 1786 case of Trevett v. Weeden 59 provides some
evidence of Rhode Island's high court judges' practice of giving ad-
vice and counsel to the General Assembly. Public accounts of the
trial persuaded the General Assembly that the justices had de-
clared a statute unconstitutional and void, causing the General
Assembly to summon the judges to appear to explain themselves. 60
Contemporary accounts reported the testimony of one of the
judges, Judge Howell:
He observed that, the order by which the judges were be-
fore the House might be considered as calling upon them
to assist in matters of legislation, or to render the reasons
for their judicial determination, as being accountable to
the legislature for their judgment. That in the former
view, the court was ever ready, as constituting the legal
counselors of the state, to render every kind of assistance
to the legislatfure], in framing new or repealing former
laws: but that for reasons of their judgment upon any
question judicially before them, they were accountable
only to God and their own conscience. 61
Howell freely admitted the judges could be called upon in the
legislative process, a service which "fit precisely within the job de-
scription of a British judge commanded to assist the House of
Lords in legislative affairs."62
The idea that the judiciary would be subject to the control of
the legislature, as reflected in Rhode Island's Charter government,
was not an exceptional or novel idea in the time immediately fol-
57. Id.
58. CONLEY, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 244.
59. The case is unpublished. A brief account of the case is printed in
James M. Varnum, The Case, Trevett Against Weeden: On Information and
Complaint for Refusing Paper Bills in Payment for Butcher's Meat in Market,
at Par with Specie (1787).
60. Harrington, supra note 42, at 80.
61. JAY, supra note 33, at 55 (quoting The Case, Trevett against Weedon
& Co. (Providence, John Carter, 1787)) (emphasis added).
62. Id.
20041
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lowing the American Revolution. Although the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers would eventually become what James Madison
would call "a first principle of free government,"63 professor and
historian Gordon S. Wood has written that "Americans in 1776
gave only a verbal recognition to the concept of separation of pow-
ers in their Revolutionary constitutions, since they were appar-
ently not concerned with a real division of departmental
functions."64 Some historians believe that separation of powers in
the 1776 state constitutions meant "nothing more than a prohibi-
tion of plural office holding."65 Wood goes on to explain:
Despite John Adam's warnings in his Thoughts on Gov-
ernment that "an upright and skillful administration of
justice" required the judicial power "to be distinct from
both the legislative and executive, and independent upon
both," most of the early constitution-makers had little
sense that judicial independence meant independence
from the people .... [C]onstitutional provisions giving
control of the courts and judicial tenure to the legisla-
tures actually represented the culmination of what the co-
lonial assemblies had been struggling for in their
eighteenth century contests with the Crown. The Revolu-
tionaries had no intention of curtailing legislative inter-
ference in the court structure, and in fact they meant to
increase it.66
According to Wood, "[tihe expanded meaning of separation of
powers,... along with a new conception of judicial independence,
had to await the experience of the years ahead."67 In the years af-
ter 1776, concerns about "the effects of legislative sovereignty and
[its] unanticipated excesses" caused the invocation of "the princi-
ple of separation of powers in order to unscramble what seemed to
be a dangerous blurring of the three major functions of govern-
ment,"68 and "In] early all of the proposals for constitutional change
being put forward in these years could be explained as a means of
63. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-
1787 152 (Univ. N.C. Press 1969).
64. Id. at 153-54.
65. Id. at 156.
66. Id. at 161.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 451.
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separating the three functions of government."69
Despite the evolution of the principle of separation of powers
and the importance of an independent judiciary that may have
been occurring in other parts of America at the time, however,
Rhode Island's Charter government resisted embracing that evo-
lution. By 1841, however, "the omnipotence and adamancy of the
legislature" - along with limited suffrage and increasing malap-
portionment - became grievances severe enough for the estab-
lishment of a new constitutional document70 The "agitation [for
reform eventually] prompted the General Assembly to authorize a
constitutional convention" for November 1841.71 The reformers,
however, "exhorted the adult male citizenry to disregard the land-
holding qualifications [for voting] and to go to the polls to elect
delegates to a 'People's Convention,' which would meet in Octo-
ber."72 While the Landholders Convention authorized by the Char-
ter government did not produce a draft constitution, the People's
Convention presented a proposed constitution to the white male
population for ratification, regardless of whether they were land-
holders. 73 It emphatically called for a separation of power between
the legislature and the judiciary, and the independence of the ju-
diciary, providing:
Article III
Of the Distribution of Powers
1. The powers of the Government shall be distributed into
three departments, the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judicial.
2. No person or persons connected with one of these de-
partments shall exercise any of the powers belonging to
either of the others, except in cases herein directed or
permitted.
69. Id. at 452.
70. CONLEY, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 205.
71. Id. at 245.
72. Id. at 246.
73. Id.
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Article IV
Of the Legislative Department
1. The Legislative power shall be vested in two distinct
Houses, the one to be called the House of Representa-
tives, the other the Senate, and both together the General
Assembly.
Article IX
General Provisions
1. This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the
State; and all laws contrary to, or inconsistent with the
same, which may be passed by the General Assembly,
shall be null and void.
4. No jurisdiction shall hereafter be entertained by the
General Assembly in cases of... appeal from judicial de-
cisions, nor in any other matters appertaining to the ju-
risdiction of Judges, and Courts of law. But the General
Assembly shall confer upon the Courts of the State all
necessary powers for affording relief in the cases herein
named; and the General Assembly shall exercise all other
jurisdiction and authority, which they have heretofore en-
tertained, and which is not prohibited by, or repugnant to
this Constitution.
Article XI
Of the Judiciary
1. The Judicial power of this State shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such other Courts, inferior to the
Supreme Court, as the Legislature may, from time to
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time, ordain and establish.7 4
The new constitutional scheme envisioned by the People's
Constitution represented a dramatic departure from the Charter,
providing for a clear separation of judicial and legislative power,
and prohibiting the judiciary from exercising legislative powers
and the General Assembly from exercising judicial power. Perhaps
because of this clean break from the Charter's melding of judicial
and legislative power in the General Assembly, and the introduc-
tion of the separation of powers into Rhode Island's constitutional
scheme, the People's Constitution made no provision for the jus-
tices to act as legal counselors to render advice to the coordinate
branches of the proposed government.
In response the Landholder's Convention was reconvened and
produced a draft of an alternative constitution, sometimes re-
ferred to as the Landholder's or Freeman's Constitution.7 5 Al-
though this proposed constitution, drafted by a convention
convened by the General Assembly, ostensibly called for a separa-
tion of powers, it effectively rejected separation of judicial and leg-
islative power and instead proposed a continued co-mingling of
those powers in the General Assembly as had been the practice
under the Charter. This Freeman's Constitution provided:
Article Third
(To be inserted)
[Of the Distribution of Powers.
Section 1. The powers of the government shall be distrib-
uted into three distinct departments: the Legislative, Ex-
ecutive and Judicial.
Sec. 2. No person or persons belonging to one of these de-
partments shall exercise any of the powers properly be-
longing to either of the others, except in cases herein
expressly directed or permitted.]
74. R.I. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 3; art. IV, § 1; art. IX, §§ 1, 4; art. XI, § 1
(Proposed Draft 1841), reprinted in 2 ELISHA R. POTTER, RHODE ISLAND
CONSTITUTION (1843). These proposals were finally adopted by the Conven-
tion of the People. See POrTER, supra.
75. See CONLEY, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 249-50.
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Article Fourth
Of the Legislative Power
Section 1. This Constitution shall be the supreme law of
the State, and all laws enacted contrary thereto, shall be
void.
Sec. 2. The Legislative power, under this Constitution,
shall be vested in two distinct Houses, or Branches,...
the one to be styled the Senate, the other the House of
Representatives; and both together, the General Assem-
bly.
Sec. 10. The General Assembly shall continue to exercise
the judicial power, ... and all other powers they have
heretofore exercised not inconsistent with this Constitu-
tion.
Article Eleventh
Of the Judicial Power
Sec. 1. The Judicial power of this state shall be vested in
one Supreme Judicial Court, and in such other inferior
Courts as the General Assembly may from time to time
ordain and establish;
Sec. 6. The Judges of the Supreme Judicial Court, shall in
all trials instruct the Jury in the law, and it shall be the
duty of said Judges, to give their opinions upon questions
of law, when required by the Governor, or either House of
the General Assembly. 76
The Landholders' proposed constitution essentially called for
a continuation of the relationship the supreme court justices and
76. R.I. CONST., art. III, §§ 1, 2; art. IV, §§ 1, 2, 10; art. XI, §§ 1, 6 (Pro-
posed Draft 1842), reprinted in 2 POTTER, supra note 74.
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the General Assembly had had under the Charter. The justices
would not possess any independent power, ultimate judicial au-
thority would remain in the General Assembly, and as a conse-
quence the justices could, and would, continue to act as counselors
rendering legal advice to the General Assembly as well as the
Governor.
After the Freeman's Constitution was narrowly defeated at
the polls, two rival governments were subsequently elected - one
under the People's Constitution and a "Law and Order" govern-
ment under the Charter - which gave rise to a period of turmoil
known as the Dorr Rebellion.7 7 When the Law and Order party
prevailed, it convened another constitutional convention in the fall
of 1842 which substantially framed the present constitution. 78
That constitution was remarkable for its ambiguity with respect to
the separation of judicial and legislative power, and the independ-
ence of the judiciary. Whereas the People's Constitution and the
Freeman's Constitution took clearly opposed but clearly expressed
positions on the appropriate political and governmental structure,
the constitution that was ultimately enacted seems to have been
deliberately ambiguous, leaving the question unresolved. The Law
and Order Constitution provided:
Article Third
Of the Distribution of Powers
The powers of government shall be distributed into three
departments; the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial.
Article Fourth
Of the Legislative Powers
Section 1. The Constitution shall be the supreme law of
the State, and any law inconsistent therewith shall be
void. The General Assembly shall pass all laws necessary
to carry this Constitution into effect.
Sec. 2. The Legislative power, under this Constitution,
shall be vested in two Houses, the one to be called the
77. See CONLEY, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 251-66.
78. Id. at 266.
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Senate, the other the House of Representatives; and both
together the General Assembly.
Sec. 10. The General Assembly shall continue to exercise
the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless prohib-
ited in this constitution.
Article Tenth
Of the Judicial Power
Section 1. The Judicial power of this State shall be vested
in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the
General Assembly may, from time to time, ordain and es-
tablish.
Sec. 3. The Judges of the Supreme Court shall, in all tri-
als, instruct the jury in the law. They shall also give their
written opinion upon any question of law whenever re-
quested by the Governor, or by either House of the Gen-
eral Assembly. 79
The People's Constitution specifically removed the ultimate
judicial power from the General Assembly and placed it solely in
the Supreme Court; it also provided for a clear demarcation be-
tween legislative and judicial power, and omitted the justices' pre-
constitutional role as legal advisors to the executive and legisla-
tive elements of government.80 The Freeman's, or Landholder's,
Constitution, however, specifically reserved ultimate judicial
power to the General Assembly; in addition, it blurred the line be-
tween judicial and legislative power; and, not surprisingly, con-
tinued the justices' obligation to act extra-judicially as legal
advisors and counselors for the government.81 The constitution ul-
79. R.I. CONST. art. III; art. IV, §§ 1, 2, 10; art. X, §§ 1, 3 (Proposed 1842),
reprinted in 2 POrrER, supra note 74. These provisions were adopted by the
Convention assembled at Newport. See POTTER, supra.
80. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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timately adopted in 1842, however, did not specifically address the
General Assembly's exercise of judicial power.8 2 While it clearly
called for the separation of legislative and judicial power, it simul-
taneously permitted the General Assembly to continue to exercise
all the powers it had previously exercised, and called for the jus-
tices to act in a non-judicial advisory capacity as they had under
the pre-separation of powers Charter. 83
Left open by the text was the question of whether the princi-
ple of separation of powers and the vesting of judicial power in the
Supreme Court deprived the General Assembly of the judicial
power it had "heretofore exercised"? There is evidence the General
Assembly thought it did not. The first digest of laws enacted after
the constitution became effective, the General Laws of 1844, con-
tained an act modernizing the method of petitioning the General
Assembly for review of decisions of the Court.8 4 Thus it seems evi-
dent the General Assembly was preparing to continue its pre-
constitutional position as the state's ultimate appellate authority,
and if it did, there would be nothing remarkable about continuing
the justices' advisory and counseling role or about them remaining
in a role essentially subservient to a General Assembly - which
could overrule their decisions as a court, or reject their advice as
counselors. As we shall soon see, however, the Supreme Court it-
self viewed the new constitutional order, in particular the rela-
tionship of the judiciary and the legislators, quite differently.
The tension between the command of separate powers with
ultimate judicial power being in the supreme court, and the Gen-
eral Assembly's view that it could continue to exercise judicial ap-
pellate power - eventually began its path to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court in 1854 with the case of Taylor v. Place.85 The
General Assembly had ordered a new trial for garnishees of a
company indebted to another firm; prior to this order the courts
had rejected a claim for a new trial.8 6 This exercise of judicial
82. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
83. See id.
84. See Patrick T. Conley, Article VI, Section 4: A Case Study in Constitu-
tional Obsolescence, 53 R.I. BAR J. 2, at 10.
85. See C. Peter Magrath, Samuel Ames: The Great Chief Justice of
Rhode Island, in LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF LAW AND LAWYERS IN
RHODE ISLAND: 1636-1998, 309 (Patrick T. Conley ed., 1998); Taylor v. Place,
4 R.I. 324, *1 (1856).
86. See id. at *12 n. 1.
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power was then challenged under the new constitution. The Su-
preme Court's subsequent interpretation of the constitution's
separation of powers, in a decision authored by Chief Justice
Ames, fundamentally altered the constitutional arrangement of
judicial and legislative roles.87 Ames held that the General As-
sembly's action constituted the exercise of judicial power, and that
the constitution's distribution of powers:
was.., made for the special purpose of depriving the gen-
eral assembly of their long exercised judicial power,
which, rightly or wrongly, that body had assumed under
the Charter .... It was the assumption of judicial power
by the general assembly, which must have been specially
aimed at by this clause of distribution.88
Chief Justice Ames asserted that "[a]n independent, responsi-
ble judiciary is the only safeguard of our property, lives, and liber-
ties,"8 9 and as historian Patrick Conley has written, "[t]he
legislature acquiesced in this bold decision in 1857, when its new
digest of general laws revised the petition process to exclude the
traditional review of court cases."90 Thus the separation of powers
and independence of the judiciary were imbued with a signifi-
cantly stronger character in the constitutional scheme.
Given this invigoration of the separation of powers and the
independence of the judiciary, the post-Taylor advisory power nec-
essarily required a greater sensitivity to such concerns than did
the pre-Taylor advisory power. In fact, it seems this was at least
considered. On two occasions, first in 1899 and then in 1915, two
separate commissions created by the General Assembly recom-
mended numerous revisions to the state constitution which in-
cluded, among other changes, a proposed revision to the advisory
clause that would have given the justices discretion to decline to
answer questions submitted to them.91 The revised clause would
have provided: "The justices of the Supreme Court shall give their
87. See Magrath, supra note 85, at 310.
88. Taylor, 4 R.I. at *12 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at *10.
90. Conley, supra note 84, at 10.
91. JOINT SPECIAL COMM. ON CONST. AMENDS. REPORT TO R.I. GEN.
ASSEMBLY, at 27 (Jan. 1899) (on file with author); REPORT OF COMM'N TO
CONSIDER THE AMEND. AND REVISION OF THE CONST., at 37 (Jan. 1915) (on file
with author).
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written opinion upon any question of law whenever requested by
the governor or by either house of the general assembly: provided,
that they may decline to answer such questions as in their opinion
they cannot properly decide."92 The entire 1898 proposed revised
constitution, however, was rejected by the electorate, and the pro-
posed revisions of the 1915 draft constitution were never submit-
ted to the voters. 93 Nevertheless, the justices themselves would,
over time, begin imposing limitations on the advisory power, 94 and
would give constitutional recognition to the tension caused by in-
cluding a pre-separation of powers advisory function in a constitu-
tional document premised on the separation of legislative,
executive, and judicial power.
B. The Rhode Island Justices' Interpretation of the Constitutional
Grant of Advisory Power
The most notable limitations on the advisory power were con-
ceived in the 1960's to accommodate the separation of powers and
its corollary, the independence of the judiciary. The limitations,
however, eventually came to be focused only on the justices' obli-
gation to advise under article 10, section 3. As asserted earlier,
however, the phrase "shall give their written opinion upon any
question of law whenever requested"95 is not only the source of the
justices' obligation to act as legal advisors, it is also the source of
their authority to do so. The source of both authority and obliga-
tion is plainly the same; authority and obligation are indivisible
and coextensive. Where there is authority there is obligation;
where there is obligation there is authority. In interpreting sec-
tion 3, however, the justices have described when they are "consti-
tutionally required"96 to give a written opinion to one of the
coordinate branches, and limited their discussions to the "consti-
tutional mandate"97 of article 10, section 3 and the circumstances
92. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 4 (Proposed Revision of 1899), reprinted in 2
POTTER, supra note74.
93. Conley, supra note 84, at 11.
94. See Mel A. Topf, The Jurisprudence of the Advisory Opinion Process
in Rhode Island, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 207, 235-36 (1996).
95. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 3 (emphasis added).
96. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Casino), 856 A.2d 320, 324
(R.I. 2004).
97. In re Request for Advisory Opinion from the Governor (Warwick Sta-
tion Project), 812 A.2d 789, 790 (R.I. 2002).
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in which they are "constitutionally obligated"98 to give advisory
opinions. Their power to advise extra-judicially and the obligation
for them to do so, however, are two sides of the same coin; when
the justices interpreted section 3 to limit and frame their obliga-
tion to give advisory opinions, they also limited and framed their
constitutional authority to do so as well. The two seminal cases in-
terpreting the constitutional text to include limits on the obliga-
tion to give advisory opinions, Opinion to the Governor99 and
Opinion to the House of Representatives ,100 demonstrate the propo-
sition that obligation and authority are indivisible.
In the 1963 Opinion to the Governor,10 1 the justices acknowl-
edged the advisory power was a "peculiar obligation"10 2 distinct
from the exercise of judicial power. 03 The justices asserted it was
included in the constitution "to enable the executive and legisla-
tive departments to more effectively discharge particular duties
that are textually committed to them by the constitution."10 4 The
justices reasoned the framers of the provision must have believed
effective legislative and executive performance "require[d] from
time to time assistance from the judges of [the] court upon ques-
tions of law, assistance which the framers contemplated as being
best provided through the device of an advisory opinion."10 5 Con-
sequently, when the advisory clause is "read in this light:"106
it becomes clear that the requirement that such an opin-
ion be given "upon any question of law" was intended to
be exclusory in effect. It was intended primarily to exclude
the requirement that such opinions be given upon ques-
tions of law that do not challenge the consistency of law,
enacted or proposed, with pertinent constitutional provi-
sions.... [W]e are of the opinion that the pertinent con-
stitutional provision [article 10, section 3] requires that
the judges of this court furnish advisory opinions only
98. In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 1316, 1318 (R.I.
1986).
99. 191 A.2d 611 (R.I. 1963).
100. 208 A.2d 126 (R.I. 1965).
101. 191 A.2d 611.
102. Id. at 614.
103. Id. at 613.
104. Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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with respect to the consistency with constitutional provi-
sions of legislation enacted or proposed. 107
Stated differently, the justices concluded the phrase "any
question of law" was not intended by the framers to mean any
question of law, but rather only questions of law concerning the
constitutionality of proposed or enacted legislation. They reached
this interpretation because of the separation of powers principle.
The justices have reasoned that "article 5 of the Rhode Island
Constitution provides for a tripartite form of government, stating:
'The powers of the government shall be distributed into three de-
partments: the legislative, executive and judicial,""0 8 and the jus-
tices have adhered to the view that this separation of powers "is
an integral element of the republican form of government." 1 9 It
acts to limit one branch of government from "interfer[ing] imper-
missibly with the other's performance of its constitutionally as-
signed function."110 In the 1963 advisory, the justices concluded
the advisory power must be interpreted so as to not disturb this
fundamental characteristic of American constitutional govern-
ment.' The justices considered whether the questions pro-
pounded to them in that instance could reasonably be held "to
come within the scope of sec. 2 of art. XII of the amendments."' 12 In
determining the scope of the state constitution's advisory clause,
the justices noted their "reluctance to subvert the principle of the
separation of powers by translating the obligation to give advisory
opinions upon request into a grant of authority to give such opin-
ions where the inquiry is not such as to reasonably be within the
purview of the constitutional provisions." 113 The justices believed
limits on the advisory opinion clause were necessary because of its
"obvious repugnance . . . to the principle of separation of pow-
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Comm'n), 612 A.2d 1,
15 (R.I. 1992).
109. Id. at 18; see also In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d 664,
674 (R.I. 1993).
110. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d 55, 102 (R.I. 1999)
(Flanders, J.) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963 (1983) (Powell, J.
concurring)).
111. Opinion to the Governor, 191 A.2d at 613.
112. Id. (emphasis added). Note that article III, section 2 the justices ref-
erenced in 1963 is now article X, section 3.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
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ers,"114 and that they had a "'duty, in view of the separation of the
executive, legislative and judicial departments of government, to
abstain from [giving an advisory opinion] in any case which does
not fall reasonably within the constitutional clause."'115 Stated
succinctly, the justices determined the text of article 10, section 3
was to be strictly construed in light of the fundamental principle
marking both the federal and state constitutional systems -
namely, the separation of powers - and that this limited the
"grant of authority to give such opinions."116
Two years later the same justices made explicit what was im-
plicit in the separation of powers limitation. In the 1965 advisory
Opinion to the House of Representatives1 7, the justices declared
the purpose of the advisory clause - to assist the executive and
legislative branches in the performance of their own constitutional
duties - was both "narrow" and "substantially limited.""8 The jus-
tices warned "undue expansion of that purpose by judicial fiat"
would have an "obvious adverse effect" on the "constitutional
separation of powers" by injecting the justices into the governmen-
tal functions constitutionally committed to other branches of gov-
ernment.119 Considering the principle of separation of powers
persuaded the justices that the scope of the constitutional advi-
sory power was limited to rendering opinions to either House of
the General Assembly only on proposed legislation, and to the ex-
ecutive branch only when the question concerned the constitu-
tionality of legislation that was already enacted. 20 In other words,
the advisory clause authorized the court to give assistance to the
legislature when it was considering whether to enact legislation,
and to the executive when he or she was called to execute enacted
legislation. Later justices would refine the interpretation of article
10, section 3 to explicitly state that its application to questions
from the governor was also limited to occasions in which the stat-
ute at issue required implementation by the executive,' 2' and had
114. Id. at 614.
115. Id. (quoting To Certain Members of the Senate in the General As-
sembly, 191 A. 518, 520 (R.I. 1937)).
116. Id. at 613.
117. 208 A.2d 126 (R.I. 1965).
118. Id. at 127-28.
119. Id. at 127.
120. See id. at 127-28.
121. See In re Request for Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Rhode Island
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a bearing upon a present constitutional duty awaiting the execu-
tive's performance. 122
The justices have recognized that in light of these limitations
it follows that neither the governor nor the legislature possess
"standing to propound questions which are clearly the prerogative
of the other."123 That means the constitutional advisory clause
does not permit justices to advise the governor concerning the con-
stitutionality of proposed legislation being considered by the gen-
eral assembly, or to advise either House of the General Assembly
concerning the governor's obligation to implement already enacted
legislation. As interpreted by the justices, the purpose of the advi-
sory clause permits the justices to provide advice to either the leg-
islative or executive branch about the constitutionality of its own
action, not about the actions of the other branch. It was not in-
tended as a means for one branch to supervise the other. 24 Ques-
tions from one branch seeking "advice" concerning how the
remaining branch is fulfilling its constitutional duties "are almost
always highly political;" 25 the agenda of an advisory opinion is
more political than adjudicatory because it is not brought by a pri-
vate litigant challenging legislation that has brought them injury,
but instead by one branch of government which is attempting to
use the court to influence the other. 26 Permitting such questions
Ethics Comm'n-Separation of Powers), 732 A.2d 55, 59 (R.I. 1999) (citing In
re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d 664, 666 (R.I. 1993)).
122. See id. (citing In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding House
Bill 83-H-5640, 472 A.2d 301, 302 (R.I. 1984)). Although this strict interpre-
tation of the text of article 10, section 3 has only occurred in the context of
.nonbinding" advisory opinions, the justices' interpretation of the constitu-
tional enabling language should be entitled to stare decisis, and in fact, sub-
sequent justices have accorded the interpretation such status and
overwhelmingly agreed with it. See Robert H. Kennedy, Advisory Opinions:
Cautions About Non-Judicial Undertakings, 23 U. RICH. L. REv. 173, 182 & n.
31 (1989); see also In re Advisory to the Governor (Casino), 856 A.2d 320 (R.I.
2004); In re Request for Advisory Opinion from the Governor (Warwick Sta-
tion Project), 812 A.2d 789, 790 (R.I. 2002); In re Advisory Opinion to the
Governor, 732 A.2d at 59; In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representa-
tives (Impoundment of State Aid to Cities and Towns), 576 A.2d 1371, 1372
(R.I. 1990); In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 1316, 1318-19
(R.I. 1986); Opinion to the Governor, 284 A.2d 295 (1971).
123. Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d at 1319; Opinion to the
Governor, 284 A.2d at 296.
124. See Topff, supra note 94, at 406.
125. Kennedy, supra note 122, at 197.
126. Id. at 179.
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poses two dangers. First, it allows the legislature or the executive,
with the assistance of the judiciary, to subtly interfere with the
constitutional duties entrusted to a separate branch. Second, it
embroils the justices in a political power contest generally "at the
height of its political tension,"127 and "risks an appearance of an
active political engagement that may be perceived as contrary to
the work of an independent judiciary." 128 The justices recognized
these dangers and limited the application of the advisory clause to
neutralize them, and to preserve the integrity of both the separa-
tion of powers and independence of the judiciary.
II. THE AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION TO RENDER ADVISORY OPINIONS
ARE COEXTENSIVE
Other than referring to the "grant of authority" to render ad-
visory opinions in Opinion to the Governor,129 the justices have not
explicitly acknowledged the coextensive nature of the authority
and obligation to give advice to the coordinate branches. It is,
however, a necessary corollary of strictly construing the phrase
"any question of law." The justices of New Hampshire's, Maine's
and Massachusetts's highest courts have been more explicit in ac-
knowledging this inevitable proposition. The Maine State Consti-
tution provides that its justices "shall be obliged to give their
opinion upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occa-
sions, when required" by the coordinate branches. 130 Both the New
Hampshire and Massachusetts constitutions declare that the co-
ordinate branches "shall have authority to require the opinions of
the justices.., upon important questions of law and upon solemn
occasions." 131 Like Rhode Island's constitutional clause, these pro-
visions obligate the justices to provide advisory opinions. Unlike
Rhode Island's clause which obligates the justices to do so "upon
any question of law,"132 these other provisions obligate the justices
to do so only "upon important questions of law and upon solemn
occasions." 33 Rhode Island justices have, however, placed an in-
127. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
128. Kennedy, supra note 122, at 197.
129. 191 A.2d 611, 613 (R.I. 1963).
130. ME. CONST. art. 6, § 3.
131. N.H. CONST. pt. 2. art. 74; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. 2.
132. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 3.
133. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
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terpretive gloss on the "any question of law" text that essentially
limits its meaning to important questions and solemn occasions as
they have defined them. But the New Hampshire, Maine and
Massachusetts justices have also characterized the "important
question of law" and "solemn occasions" qualifiers as limits, not
only upon their duty to render advisory opinions, but upon their
constitutional authority to do so as well.
New Hampshire Supreme Court justices opine that their state
constitution "empowers the justices of the supreme court to render
advisory opinions.., only in carefully circumscribed situations."134
The Maine justices have acknowledged that the "on important
questions of law" and "upon solemn occasions" qualifiers define
the scope of the "constitutional authority" as well as duty to advise
the Governor, the Senate, or the House of Representatives. 135
When the Maine justices receive a request for advice they must
first "determine whether [they] have the constitutional authority
to answer the questions,"136 and "refrain from issuing an opinion
that is... [not] within the constitutional grant of [the] advisory
power." 37 The Maine justices once explained, in language that
should apply in Rhode Island:
Only subject to carefully confined conditions does the
Maine Constitution give the Justices of the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court the extraordinary responsibility of rendering
their opinion .... An advisory opinion, which represents
the views of the individual Justices and is not the deci-
sion of the Supreme Judicial Court sitting as the Law
Court, is constitutionally permissible only "on important
questions of law, and upon solemn occasions.".. . "[T]he
boundaries set by the Constitution on our duty to furnish
opinions are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly
observed in order to preserve the fundamental principle of
134. In re Opinion of the Justices, 824 A.2d 816, 818 (N.H. 2003) (empha-
sis added).
135. Opinion of the Justices, 460 A.2d 1341, 1345 (Me. 1982) (emphasis
added).
136. Opinion of the Justices, 709 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Me. 1997) (citing Opin-
ion of the Justices, 682 A.2d 661, 663 (Me. 1996); see also Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 674 A.2d 501, 502 (Me. 1996) (citing Opinion of the Justices, 623 A.2d
1258, 1261 (Me. 1993)).
137. Opinion of the Justices, 674 A.2d at 502.
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the separation of the judicial from the executive and leg-
islative branches of government."138
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court justices also recognize
that the advisory clause in their state constitution is "[tihe source
of the authority and the duty of the Justices to render advisory
opinions."139 The Massachusetts Constitution not only "define[s]
the extent of the duty of the Justices to furnish opinions, but it
also limits their right to express them.... The Justices must ad-
here strictly to the jurisdictional boundaries established ... in or-
der to safeguard the separation of powers embodied in art. 30 of
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights." 40 If no "solemn occa-
sion" exists, as that term is interpreted by the justices, they "are
constitutionally constrained from rendering an advisory opinion
regardless of the importance of the particular questions."' 4 ' They
acknowledge that while "[tihere is always present the desire on
the part of the Justices to comply with the request for an opin-
ion... the duty of conformity to the meaning of [the] clause is a
continuing one and cannot be avoided." 42 Justices on Massachu-
setts's Supreme Judicial Court in the 19th century stated:
While it is our duty to render opinions in all those cases
in which either branch of the legislature or the governor
and council may properly require them, it is not the less
our duty, in view of the careful separation of the executive,
legislative, and judicial departments of the government, to
abstain from doing so in any case which does not fall
within the constitutional clause. 43
Therefore, despite at least three of her sister states' ready and
continued observance of the distinction between the constitutional
authority and obligation to render an advisory opinion, Rhode Is-
138. Opinion of the Justices, 460 A.2d at 1345-46 (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted).
139. Answer of the Justices to the Council, 291 N.E.2d 598, 599 (Mass.
1973).
140. Answer of the Justices to the Senate, 780 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Mass.
2002) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
141. Answer of the Justices to the Acting Governor, 686 N.E.2d 444, 446
(Mass. 1997).
142. Answer of the Justices to the Senate, 780 N.E.2d at 446.
143. In re Power of the Legislature to Require Opinion, 24 N.E. 1086,
1087-88 (Mass. 1890) (emphasis added).
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land has declined, as of yet, to follow suit.
III. RHODE ISLAND'S PUBLIC IMPORTANCE EXCEPTION
While some might debate whether the "any question of law"
text of the advisory clause can legitimately be interpreted as nar-
rowly as the justices have interpreted it,144 even in light of separa-
tion of powers considerations, if the construed limitations are
accepted one would reasonably believe they are not only constitu-
tional limits on the questions the justices are obliged to advise on,
but limits on their constitutional authority to do so as well. If the
question meets the criteria declared by the justices, they have
both the authority and obligation to answer it. If it does not, they
do not have either. One could reasonably believe the justices
would adhere to the view that neither the text of the advisory
clause nor the justices' interpretation of it admit of any discretion.
But the justices have in fact asserted a discretionary authority to
answer questions falling outside of the constitutional parameters
they themselves have declared.
When article 10, section 3 was first interpreted in 1965 to ap-
ply only to both questions from either house of the General As-
sembly as to the constitutionality of proposed legislation, and from
the Governor on the constitutionality of legislation already en-
acted, the justices counseled against "undue expansion" of the
scope of the advisory power by "judicial fiat" because to do so it
would have an "obvious adverse effect" on the constitutional sepa-
ration of powers. 145 The limitations were necessary to permit the
command of the separation of powers of article 5 to constitution-
ally coexist with advisory power of article 10, section 3.146 In 1971
they opined they would "scrupulously avoid giving advisory opin-
ions in circumstances not constitutionally mandated" because to
144. Former Justice Robert G. Flanders, Jr. has described the language of
article 10, section 3 as "unequivocal, preemptory, and without qualification."
In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Rhode Island Ethics Comm'n - Sepa-
ration of Powers), 732 A.2d 55, 74 (R.I. 1999) (Flanders, J.). He has opined
that none of the limitations that other justices have gleaned from the text of
the advisory section in light of the separation of powers principle "have any
basis in the constitution." In re Request for Advisory Opinion from the Gov-
ernor (Warwick Station Project), 812 A.2d 789, 792 (R.I. 2002) (Flanders, J.).
145. Opinion to the House of Representatives, 208 A.2d 126, 127 (R.I.
1965).
146. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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do so "would amount to inexcusable gratuitousness."147
The description "inexcusable gratuitousness" is perplexing.
Rather than declaring they had no constitutional authority to act
when a question propounded to them was outside the limitations
imposed by their interpretation of the text, they instead claimed it
would be gratuitous to act. Rather than clearly defining the limit
of their authority, they left it opaque. This began the justices' fo-
cus on the limits on their constitutional obligation to render an
advisory opinion, while neglecting consideration of the limits of
their constitutional authority to do so. They would "scrupulously
avoid" giving advisory opinions on questions that did not meet the
criteria they had set forth, not because it would be unconstitu-
tional or beyond their constitutionally conferred advisory author-
ity, but merely because it would be inexcusably gratuitous to do
so. Thus, the justices chose language implying they had no obliga-
tion to render advice on questions that did not meet the constitu-
tional parameters they had placed on the advisory authority, but
refrained from explicitly declaring they had no constitutional au-
thority to answer such questions. The subtle implication was that
obligation and authority were severable, without explaining why
or where their advisory authority then purported to come from.
The severance of authority from obligation lay dormant for a
time, but the implied assertion of an extra-constitutional discre-
tionary power to advise began to bloom fifteen years later in In re
Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice).148 At issue was a request for an
advisory opinion regarding a resolution, proposed in the Senate, to
vacate the seat held by the Court's Chief Justice. 149 The request
for the advisory came, however, from the Governor, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the Majority Leader of the Sen-
ate. 150 The justices noted the Governor had no present constitu-
tional duty awaiting performance, 151 and consequently, his request
was outside the scope of the advisory clause as it had been con-
strued. They also noted both the request of the Speaker and of the
Senate Majority Leader were brought by the leaders only, and
were not the result of formal action taken collectively by either
147. Opinion to the Governor, 284 A.2d 295, 296 (R.I. 1971).
148. 507 A.2d 1316 (R.I. 1986)
149. Id. at 1317.
150. Id. at 1318.
151. Id. at 1319.
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house of the General Assembly. 152 Notwithstanding the fact that
the justices had many years earlier opined that the advisory
clause could be triggered only by the collective action of either
house, they labeled this a mere "procedural deficienc[y] ... in view
of the fact that either branch of the Legislature could independ-
ently, by majority vote, propound the same question to this
court."153 Because the question concerned the legality of a pro-
posed legislative action, and a request by either house of the gen-
eral assembly would have substantively been within the scope of
the constitutional advisory authority had the legislators followed
through to make it a collective action, the justices declared they
had the discretion to waive the "procedural" defect because of "the
constitutional and public importance of the question propounded
to [the] court."154
As Chief Justice Weisberger later described, the request did
involve the constitutionality of pending legislation and "[iut was
obvious that a request propounded by the leaders of both Houses
of the General Assembly was technically defective but that such a
question could have rapidly been transformed into a request by ei-
ther House."155 Accepting the presumption that the Majority
Leader and Speaker's wishes would have been rapidly granted by
the Senate and the House, the deficiencies in In re Advisory Opin-
ion (Chief Justice) may plausibly be described as procedural. A
procedurally sufficient request by either house of the general as-
sembly would have satisfied the substantive limitations the jus-
tices had placed on the reach of the advisory power. Thus, the
discretion the justices determined they could exercise in In re Ad-
visory Opinion (Chief Justice) was not a discretion to "waive" the
advisory power's substantive limitations in the name of public im-
portance; it was simply a discretion to waive a procedural insuffi-
ciency when the substantive limitation would have been satisfied.
The "procedural" appellation, however, would soon be inexplicably
transported to the substantive limitations.
Four years later, in In re Advisory Opinion to the House of
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1319-20.
155. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives (Impound-
ment of State Aid to Cities and Towns), 576 A.2d 1371, 1376 (R.I. 1990)
(Weisberger, J., dissenting).
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Representatives (Impoundment of State Aid to Cities and
Towns),156 a majority of the justices agreed to provide advice to the
House because of the "public importance" of the question. 15 7 How-
ever, as then Chief Justice Weisberger pointed out in a dissenting
opinion:
[T]he House of Representatives clearly propounds a ques-
tion that has nothing to do with the constitutionality of
pending legislation. The request seeks an advisory opin-
ion concerning a duty to be performed by the Governor in
respect to legislation already enacted. Such a question
under our cases should not be answered pursuant to arti-
cle X, section 3, of the 1986 Rhode Island Constitution or
its predecessor article XII, section 2, of the Amendments
to the Constitution of 1843.
Any reply from this court to an advisory request made
by the House of Representatives in respect to a duty to be
performed by the Governor is particularly inappropriate
in light of the undisputed fact that the Governor does not
seek our advice on this question. Indeed, the Governor
has filed a brief clearly indicating that he feels that at
this time our answer to such a question propounded by
the House of Representatives would be a violation of our
precedents. With this position I wholeheartedly agree. 58
The remaining justices relied on In re Opinion (Chief Jus-
tice)159 as the sole authority for waiving "procedural defects" in
cases of public importance, 60 effectively enlarging the procedural
label to encompass the substantive limitations that had previously
limited their constitutional authority to issue an advisory opinion.
The justices did not discard the limitations, or repudiate the rea-
soning that led prior justices to interpret the text of the advisory
clause to include them. Instead, they simply masked them with a
label that would imply they were something they were not. As one
former justice of the court might have said of such an effort, you
156. 576 A.2d 1371 (R.I. 1990).
157. Id. at 1372.
158. Id. at 1376 (Weisberger, J. dissenting).
159. 507 A.2d 1316.
160. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives (Impoundment
of State Aid to Cities and Towns), 576 A.2d at 1372.
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can call a cat a dog, but that won't make it bark. 161 Nevertheless,
the transmutation of the substantive limitations on the advisory
powers, limitations intended to protect the principle of separation
of powers, was now complete. The substantive interpretation of
"any question of law," to be limited to questions from either house
of the General Assembly concerning the constitutionality of pend-
ing legislation, or to questions from the Governor concerning the
constitutionality of existing statutes requiring his or her imple-
mentation, would subsequently be called mere "procedural infir-
mities"162 or "procedural deficiencies" 163 that the justices had the
discretion to waive. In effect, what had been constitutional
boundaries on the justices' authority to issue advisory opinions
were now waivable. The justices elected to breach the wall previ-
ously erected to protect, enforce and strengthen the separation of
powers, agreeing to offer advisory opinions to the Governor on leg-
islation that was pending in the legislature 64 and to the General
Assembly on questions concerning previously enacted legislation
that was then the constitutional responsibility of the Governor to
execute. 65 In sum, the justices elected to exercise a discretion to
advise one branch about what the other branch was doing or
should be doing, based on the justices' assessment of the public
importance of the question presented. 66
The "public importance" exception reached its zenith, how-
ever, in the 2004 advisory opinion to the Governor concerning the
constitutionality of the Casino Act. 67 Although neither house of
161. See, e.g., Cohen v. Harrington, 722 A.2d 1191, 1195 (R.I. 1999)
(Bourcier, J.) ("Labeling a cat a dog certainly will not cause a cat to bark.");
Peerless Ins. Co. v. Viegas, 667 A.2d 785, 789 (R.I. 1995) (Bourcier, J.) ("A
plaintiff, by describing his or her cat to be a dog, cannot simply by that de-
scriptive designation cause the cat to bark.").
162. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Casino), 856 A.2d 320, 324
(R.I. 2004).
163. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Rhode Island Ethics Comm'n
- Separation of Powers), 732 A.2d 55, 59 (R.I. 1999); In re Advisory from the
Governor, 633 A.2d 664, 667 (R.I. 1993).
164. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Casino), 856 A.2d at 327;
In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d at 59; In re Advisory From
the Governor, 633 A.2d at 667.
165. See In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 576 A.2d
1371, 1372 (R.I. 1990).
166. E.g., In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Casino), 856 A.2d at
324-25.
167. Id. at 320; see also The Rhode Island Gaming Control and Revenue
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the General Assembly sought the justices' advice concerning the
constitutionality of the Act, and the justices acknowledged the
Governor had no present obligation to implement the legislation
for which he sought an advisory opinion, that fact was merely a
"procedural hurdle[ ] that must be cleared before [the court's] duty
to issue an advisory opinion [arose]," and this "procedural infir-
mit[y]" meant only that they were "not constitutionally required to
issue an advisory opinion." 168 As other justices had done before
them, they proceeded to issue an advisory opinion claiming the
discretion to issue such an opinion upon any request raising "im-
portant constitutional or social questions," discretion to be exer-
cised on a "case by case basis" with no "clearly defined test" for
when they would or should exercise it.169 The idea of constitutional
limits on the authority to issue an advisory opinion was now com-
pletely divorced from the constitutional limits on the obligation to
issue them. The parameters that, in the name of separation of
powers, limited the "standing" of the legislative and executive
branches to seek advice concerning the exercise of their own con-
stitutional duties now only limited what questions the justices
were obligated to answer, not their authority to answer them. 70
No analysis, however, addressed the source of the justices' author-
ity to render non-judicial written advice to the legislature or the
governor outside the parameters they had found in the constitu-
tional text, and whether that authority was limited by article 10,
section 3 and the separation of powers.' 71 What had been (and are)
substantive constitutional limitations on the justices' advisory
power were now labeled mere procedural technicalities the jus-
tices could waive at their discretion, unfettered by any articulated
standards as to when the discretion should be exercised. That is a
long way from "shall give their written opinion upon any question
of law whenever requested." 172
In fashioning the public importance exception, the justices fo-
cused exclusively on whether they should answer a question that
Act (Casino Act), 2004 R.I. Pub. Laws 594 (2004-S 2338 Substitute A as
Amended).
168. Id. at 324 (first emphasis added).
169. Id. at 324-25.
170. See id. at 324.
171. See id. at 324-25.
172. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 3.
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does not come within their own interpretation of article 10, section
3, but not at all on whether they could answer such a question.173
The justices have effectively asserted that article 10, section 3
gives them the authority to answer all questions propounded by
the Governor and the Legislature, but limits only the questions
they are obligated to answer. 174 In asserting this extraordinary in-
terpretation of the advisory clause text, the justices offered no in-
terpretive analysis or explanation, nor did they address the
implications of their expansive view of extrajudicial advisory
power on the principle of separation of powers. 175 In a 1990 advi-
sory opinion, Chief Justice Weisberger characterized the resort to
the public importance exception as "inappropriate" and "a viola-
tion of our precedents." 176 He was respectfully restrained; the pub-
lic importance exception is outside the Rhode Island Supreme
Court justices' constitutionally conferred authority and is a breach
of "an inherent and integral element of the republican form of
government:" 177 the separation of powers. It is the unconstitu-
tional exercise of the non-judicial power.
IV. UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND DANGEROUSLY POLITICAL
As stated earlier with respect to limits on the judicial power,
"a single basic idea - the idea of separation of powers," 78 reflects
the "overriding and time-honored concern about keeping the Judi-
ciary's power within its proper constitutional sphere,"179 and coun-
sels against a court acceding to the urge to decide "the merits of []
important dispute[s] and to 'settle' [them] for the sake of conven-
ience and efficiency." 8 0 Limits on a court's authority to act "are an
essential ingredient of separation and equilibrium of powers, re-
straining the courts from acting at certain times, and even re-
straining them from acting permanently regarding certain
173. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Casino), 856 A.2d at 324.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 324-25.
176. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 576 A.2d
1371, 1376 (R.I. 1990) (Weisberger, J., dissenting).
177. In re Advisory Opinion From the Governor, 633 A.2d 664, 674 (R.I.
1993).
178. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1996) (quoting Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)).
179. Id.
180. Id.
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subjects."181 These same considerations must apply with respect to
limits on the advisory power as well. Past justices of the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court have in fact defined the constitutional limits
to the exercise of the advisory power. 182 Those limits flow from the
idea of separation of powers - an idea that recognizes the limits of
the court's powers and restrains one branch from interfering with
another's exercise of its constitutional responsibilities. 183 These
limits must be respected even where the justices are urged, in the
name of efficiency and convenience, to advise on important public
and, virtually always, political disputes.
Moreover, there are advantages to waiting to adjudicate the
constitutionality of legislation in the usual exercise of the court's
constitutionally conferred judicial power rather than in the accel-
erated procedure of an advisory opinion. Waiting "serves '[t]he
value of having courts function as organs of the sober second
thought of the community appraising action already taken, rather
than as advisers at the front line of governmental action at the
stage of initial decision."' 184 "[R]espect for separation of powers re-
quires the Judicial Branch to exercise restraint in deciding consti-
tutional issues by resolving those implicating the powers of the
three branches of Government as a 'last resort."'185 United States
Supreme Court Justice David Souter has written in a somewhat
different context that:
The counsel of restraint ... begins with the fact that a
dispute involving only officials, and the official interests
of those, who serve in the branches of the... Government
lies far from the model of the traditional common-law
cause of action at the conceptual core of the case-or-
controversy requirement.... [Ilt is in substance an inter-
branch controversy.... Intervention in such a contro-
versy would risk damaging the public confidence that is
181. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998).
182. See, e.g., Opinion to the House of Representatives, 208 A.2d 126, 127-
28 (R.I. 1965); Opinion to the Governor, 191 A.2d 611, 614 (R.I. 1963); see also
supra Part I.B.
183. See Opinion to the House of Representatives, 208 A.2d at 127; Opinion
to the Governor, 191 A.2d at 613-14.
184. JAY, supra note 33, at 5 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 478 U.S. 737, 750
(1984)).
185. Raines, 521 U.S. at 833 (Souter, J., concurring).
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vital to the functioning of the Judicial Branch.18 6
Waiting to resolve the constitutionality of a legislative act un-
til a challenge is brought by a party from outside the government
would, in Justice Souter's view, "expose the Judicial Branch to a
lesser risk [because deciding] a suit to vindicate an interest out-
side the Government raises no specter of judicial readiness to
enlist on one side of a political tug-of-war." 18 7 Souter continued to
explain that "just as the presence of a party beyond the Govern-
ment places the Judiciary at some remove from the political
forces, the need to await injury to such a plaintiff allows the
courts some greater separation in time between the political reso-
lution and the judicial review." 88 Over 180 years ago at a Massa-
chusetts constitutional convention, Justice Story argued for
removal of the advisory opinion provision from that state's consti-
tution because of the great danger that the justices would give
opinions in circumstances "exclusively of a political character," be-
lieving that such an obligation would be destructive of an inde-
pendent judiciary. 89
Advisory opinions are at odds with both the court's constitu-
tional exercise of judicial power and with the constitutional design
of separation of powers, but it is, for better or worse, a constitu-
tional obligation of the justices of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court.190 In the 1960's, however, the justices interpreted that obli-
gation in a manner that took the separation of powers into consid-
eration, making the advisory opinion fit more comfortably with
the concepts of judicial power, an independent judiciary and sepa-
ration of powers.' 9' These limitations permitted the justices to as-
sist each of the coordinate branches by giving legal advice
concerning the performance of their own constitutional duties, and
removed any temptation for the Legislature to conscript the jus-
186. Id.
187. Id. at 833-34.
188. Id. at 834.
189. Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court Given Under
the Provisions of Section 3 of Article VI of the Constitution, 343 A.2d 196, 200
n. 3 (Me. 1975) (quoting the Journal of Debate and Proceedings in the Massa-
chusetts Constitutional Convention: 1820-1821 489-90 (1853)).
190. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 3.
191. See Opinion to the House of Representatives, 208 A.2d 126, 127 (R.I.
1965); Opinion to the Governor, 191 A.2d 611, 613-14 (R.I. 1963); supra Part
I.B.
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tices into service in a dispute with the Governor, or for the Gover-
nor to likewise enlist them against the Legislature. 192 As a result,
the executive and legislative departments had access to the jus-
tices' expert legal advice if they wanted their counsel. Both were
prevented from interfering with the duties constitutionally com-
mitted to the other branch, and the Judiciary was permitted an
important measure of independence and distance from political
disputes between the other two constitutional departments.
This constitutionally desirable, permissible and defensible in-
terpretation of article 10, section 3 was accomplished by constru-
ing the constitutional phrase "any question of law.., requested by
the governor or by either house of the general assembly" 193 in light
of article 5's separation of powers command. But that very same
language is the only source of the justices' authority to render ad-
vice to a coordinate branch of state government. They are not con-
stitutionally authorized to render such advice outside of article 10,
section 3, and whatever limitations their interpretation of its lan-
guage places on their obligation to provide advice also apply to
limit their constitutional authority as members of the judicial
branch to render nonbinding, non-judicial advice to the Governor
and the Legislature. If their interpretation of the text limits their
obligation to respond, it also limits their authority to respond. If
their interpretation places some questions beyond their constitu-
tional obligation, it places those questions beyond their constitu-
tional authority.
The justices' discretionary exercise of the "public importance"
exception wholly ignores the question of the Court's authority.
While it effectively neutralizes the abilities of the other branches
to conscript the justices into an inter-branch dispute, it is far
worse that they voluntarily join such a battle and take sides. Even
more troubling, no attempt is made to fit this purported discre-
tionary authority into the justices' prior interpretation of the con-
stitutional text or its rationale, nor is such a fit readily
imaginable. An appellate court:
is limited in its interpretation of the constitution only by
self-restraint responding to legal tradition and the claims
of moral duty .... The legitimacy of judicial decrees de-
192. See Opinion to the Governor, 191 A.2d at 614.
193. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 3.
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pends... in considerable part on public confidence that
the judges are predominantly engaged not in making per-
sonal political judgments but in applying a body of law.19 4
The "public importance" exception does not fit at all with the
justice's interpretation and definition of "any question of law." Ei-
ther a question meets the criteria for a question of law under arti-
cle 10, section 3 as defined by the justices, or it does not. To
effectively interpret any "question of law" to mean any question of
law that meets the constitutional criteria the justices have de-
clared and any other question the justices might think is impor-
tant, risks the perception, true or not, of the justices "making
personal political judgments" rather than applying a body of law
in a judicial manner.195 Justice Rehnquist has written of the
United States Supreme Court's exercise of its judicial power:
Much as "Caesar had his Brutus; Charles the First his
Cromwell," Congress and the States have this Court to
ensure that their legislative Acts do not run afoul of the
limitations imposed by the United States Constitution.
But this Court has neither a Brutus nor a Cromwell to
impose a similar discipline on it. While our "right of ex-
pounding the Constitution" is confined to "cases of a Judi-
cial Nature," we are empowered to determine for
ourselves when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied.
Thus, "the only check upon our own exercise of power is
our own sense of self-restraint." I do not think the Court,
in deciding the merits of appellant's constitutional claim,
has exercised the self-restraint that Art. III requires in this
case. 
196
The same could be said of the Rhode Island justices' exercise
of the advisory power of article 10, section 3 under the public im-
portance exception.
V. CONCLUSION
Advisory opinions, like all opinions, "are only as long and as
194. Topf, supra note 94, at 249.
195. Id.
196. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 300 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis added).
2004]
162 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.lO:123
strong as the reasoning that props them up."197 There is virtually
no reasoning propping up the justices' claim that the state consti-
tution's declaration - "It]he judges of the supreme court shall give
their written opinion upon any question of law whenever re-
quested"198 - obligates them to answer some questions, but gives
them discretion to answer others. If the "question[s] of law" re-
ferred to in article 10, section 3 are limited, as the justices have
said they are, then both obligation and authority are limited.
The public importance exception applies only when one
branch of government seeks an advisory opinion about what the
other branch should have done or should be doing. When the ex-
ception is exercised the justices voluntarily inject themselves into
a highly political contest - the precise result the initial limitations
were meant to avoid. The justices would be better off to interpret
"any question of law" to mean any question of law without limita-
tion, because then it would be their constitutional duty to partici-
pate in such a dispute, rather than their choice.
Because of the nonbinding nature of advisory opinions, how-
ever, the justices "are at liberty to change their minds, to follow a
different path in later cases... and to become better educated
about what they themselves have said about the subjects ad-
dressed in these opinions when future matters arise concerning
these same legal issues."199 Although the justices, as members of
the court of last resort and final arbiter of the meaning of the state
constitution, have the power to continue to utilize the public im-
portance exception, it is respectfully submitted they have not
demonstrated the constitutional authority to do so. It has no place
under the constitutional clause, and, therefore, in the state's con-
stitutional scheme. To continue to exercise a power with no dis-
cernable constitutional authorization in politically sensitive
circumstances, no matter how valuable and useful it may be, risks
the Court's reputation for integrity and candor, and thus the pub-
lic's confidence - its most vital assets. That is too steep a price for
the public importance exception.
To borrow a phrase from the justices of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, "[niot only does the Constitution define the extent
197. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d 55, 110 (R.I. 1999)
(Flanders, J.).
198. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 3.
199. Id.
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of the duty of the Justices to furnish opinions, but it also limits
their right to express them,"200 and Justices are constitutionally
obligated to respect those limits "in order to safeguard the separa-
tion of powers."20 If the question falls without those limitations,
"the [j]ustices are constitutionally constrained from rendering an
advisory opinion regardless of the importance of the particular
questions."2 2 Fidelity to constitutional limitations on the exercise
of power must be maintained even, and especially, by the judici-
ary; for if the judiciary will not, who will?
200. Answer of the Justices to the Senate, 780 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Mass.
2002).
201. Id.
202. Answer of the Justices to the Acting Governor, 686 N.E.2d 444, 446
(Mass. 1997).
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